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ON SUBSTANCE 
Joe D. VanZandt 
The following essay is intended to lay out the impor-
tant notions and relations in a development of an adequate 
theory of substance and of understanding. But it is not 
written in a typical philosophical vein. I hope to present 
what I feel to be the proper way of considering the issues 
and proceeding on them. But I do not hope to give at any 
point a thoroughly conclusive argument, much less an 
apodictic deduction of the necessary points. I hope to 
present in each case what I feel to be true and an indica-
tion of how one might proceed to demonstrate it, but not 
actually to demonstrate this truth. The aim is merely 
plausibility, not apodicticity. But the general way of 
proceeding, I believe, is as I have indicated. 
1. On the Quest for Understanding. I take it as uncontro-
versial that Philosophy is the search for understanding, 
whatever disagreements which may exist concerning methods 
or limits of the enterprise not yet entering into considera-
tion. I take it as slightly more controversial, but still 
quite reasonable, to suggest that the special sciences 
(physics, biology, psychology, etc.) share this goal of 
understanding, though their subject matters and perhaps 
methods vary widely among themselves and collectively from 
pure philosophy. But I think it is fairly clear that the 
notion of understanding is broad enough to encompass what 
differences in objects or methods there may be or appear to 
be. Put succinctly: Understanding is the goal of rational 
inquiry generally. 
2. Conditions of Understanding. Granted that understanding 
is the goal of inquiry, the natural question, and it has been 
posed often enough in the history of philosophy, to be sure, 
is "What are the conditions of understanding?" Now it seems 
'The connection to Spinoza should be obvious. But my main 
ideas stem also from Mr. Cole's discussion in Wisdom of the 
principle of sufficient reason, although our views diverge 
widely on the implications of his view. Lastly, several 
issues discussed here owe their origins to discussions with 
T.J. Donaldson. I welcome any criticisms or elaborations of 
the contents of this essay. 
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to me that this question divides into two parts which are 
best considered separately. The first part is: What are 
the minimal conditions for understanding? And the second 
part is: What are the conditions for full or complete 
understanding? Naturally the answers to both are indis-
pensable to philosophy, but they should not be confused. 
3. Minimal Conditions of Understanding. A seemingly 
trivial but really quite significant way of stating the 
minimal condition is that the object admit of understanding; 
that the object be understandable. Now of course one must 
further analyze the minimal conditions of understandability. 
Further it should be made quite clear that the use of the 
word "object" here is to be taken in the widest possible 
sense; it is to indicate quite generally anything which 
might be inquired into, about, or of. Since some philosophers 
claim that the notion of an object contains metaphysical 
presuppositions and prefer to distinguish objects from 
certain non-objects, I beg them to understand nothing more 
by the word than a possible area of inquiry. If it be later 
used in a different sense, I shall try to make that clear. 
4. When Is a Thing Understandable? Recalling that I am 
seeking minimal conditions, it is to be expected that the 
conditions will be quite general and, to be sure, negative. 
Historically, there are two quite important principles 
which have been propounded, one the principle of non-contra-
diction, the other the principle of sufficient reason. It 
is in general not difficult to see that these in fact serve 
as minimum criteria, and while there has been considerable 
dispute about the nature and the relation of the two, and 
the applicability of the principle of sufficient reason, 
though not of the applicability of the principle of non-
contradiction, there has been no serious dispute of their 
role in understanding. I will try to put each into a form 
here which does not presuppose anything controversial about 
the nature of the principles just to exhibit the transparency 
of their relation to understanding, although an exploration 
and elucidation of the nature and relation of the principles 
must form a central portion of the discussion of substance. 
Beginning with the principle of non-contradiction, it may 
be seen that a thing cannot be thought except in accord with 
this principle, and that which cannot be thought clearly 
cannot be understood, since surely understanding is a function 
of thought. Concerning the principle of sufficient reason, 
it must first be stated, and here merely stated, that a 
thing is understood through causes (in the most general 
sense of the word) or through its ground. The principle of 
sufficient reason merely states that a thing cannot be 
understood unless there be a determining ground adequate 
to the thing. That these are minimal conditions, I take to 
be undisputed. 
5. Are There Other Minimal Conditions? I think not. That 
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there may be other limitations is surely yet an open 
question, but all other limitations will be material 
conditions. As an inventory of conditions which might 
be suggested, I will mention a few and try to indicate why 
they are not appropriate. One might suggest that only 
objects in space and time are proper objects of under-
standing, though I expect space or time is a more accurate 
way to put the point. While there may be good reasons for 
such a limitation, it seems quite clear that objects 
standing outside space and time are often the subject of 
inquiry: the immortality of the soul, the nature of space 
and time itself, and, I believe, all of mathematics, although 
the latter claim is not likely to meet with general agree-
ment. The difference in the two sorts of limitations, let 
me call one a formal limitation and the other a material 
limitation, although I would not like to place too much 
emphasis on those terms, I believe, is obvious. One might 
also suggest that objects of the understanding must be 
finite. This may be taken strictly, such that numbers 
exist only insofar as they are counted, or loosely, such as 
accepting unending or unbounded series, but not infinite 
ones. Nov/ this is an interesting suggestion, but it really 
finds its root in a supposed inability of finite intellects 
to comprehend real or absolute infinities, and is thus not 
a condition of the understandability of objects in themselves 
(so to speak!) but rather of the human ability to understand, 
and as such is not here in the same relation to objects of 
understanding as the foregoing principles. So while both 
of the foregoing material conditions may have to be granted, 
they must not be confused with minimal conditions of under-
standability . 
Note: It might be objected here that the principle of 
sufficient reason is also a limit on the ability to 
understand and so ought to be separated from the 
principle of non-contradiction and classed with the 
finitist view, but not so. The principle of sufficient 
reason is a requirement of understanding quite in general, 
whether it be a finite intellect or an infinite one, 
and whatever its mode of sensibility might be, and as 
such is indeed a minimal condition for understandability. 
6. On the Nature of the Principle of Non-contradiction. It 
is not particularly easy to arrive at a satisfactory formula-
tion of this principle, for despite, or perhaps because of, 
its all-embracing character, each formulation tends to put 
emphasis on one aspect or another of it, and certainly not 
all of these are uncontroversial. The central issue, how-
ever, is whether the principle of non-contradiction has any 
ontological significance. At least since Kant it has been 
generally thought that it does not have any direct ontologi-
cal significance, serving rather as the criterion, in the 
most minimal sense, of possible existence, without having any 
determination on actual existence. In this way of looking 
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at things, the principle is a law of thought only, not a 
principle of things. Now it is my formidable task to show 
that this position need not be quite correct. Now there is 
a certain class of objects with respect to which the 
principle of non-contradiction is often held to be constitu-
tive, and these are mathematical objects. Even Kant 
himself, although maintaining that the principle was not 
exhaustive of mathematical meaning since he maintained that 
a pure synthesis in intuition was required, held that the 
principle was constitutive in the sense that it alone was 
the principle of mathematical existence. Now of course this 
is not by any means universally accepted, as intuitionists 
(Brouwer, Heyting, et al) deny the principle of excluded 
middle in certain cases, but it is nonetheless plausible to 
claim that the principle of non-contradiction is constitu-
tive in mathematics. While this in no way demonstrates the 
point I hope to make, it does open the doorway a bit and 
points to a way of looking at things which can make the 
ontological character of the principle of non-contradiction 
both clearer and more plausible. Why is it one is willing to 
think of the principle of non-contradiction as constitutive 
in mathematics? I believe it is because he believes him-
self to be dealing with form or essence here. One thinks 
that he deals with the pure character of mathematical 
objects, and that a pure character is limited only by the 
agreement of its constituent predicates. This, I believe, 
can be expanded outside the realm of mathematics and be put 
in the following way: Insofar as the (pure) character of a 
thing is concerned, the principle of non-contradiction 
requires that no two incompatible predicates be located in 
the character of a thing. This is not particularly strong. 
It could reasonably be strengthened by adding that one and 
only one member of each mutually contradictory pair of 
predicates must belong to any arbitrary character. While 
true, I do not think it necessary at the moment to stress 
this point. I really wish here to do only one thing: Make 
the connection between essence or character and the principle 
of non-contradiction, and thus give some, however meagre, 
ontological significance to the principle. 
7. On the Nature of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. 
There has never been much question that this principle, as 
generally viewed, has ontological significance, indeed.1 So 
my purpose here is not to argue further the ontological 
significance of the principle, but to show that it has a 
deeper or wider significance than usually supposed. One 
formulation which one finds of the principle is that all 
things which happen or are (in a certain way) must have 
some determining ground for their being in that way and not 
some other. I think it proper to say that the so-called 
law of causality is in fact a limited statement of this 
principle, limited in the sense that it considers only 
spatial and temporal objects. Now I propose another way 
of putting the principle, and it is: All things must find 
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their ground in the character of an existent object. The 
ontological commitment of such a formulation is obvious. 
Perhaps the way in which it is an elaboration of the earlier 
formulation is not. This comes in two ways: first, from 
the extremely broad notion of object employed, and from the 
absolute universality of the claim. In what way does my 
formulation have a universality not found in the first? In 
the sense that the first formulation is usually taken to be 
applicable to changes of some variety. That which did not 
alter had no need for the principle. My formulation makes 
no such distinction. The principle of sufficient reason is, 
I believe, equally required by unchanging, perhaps one could 
say unchangeable, objects. This will become clearer, I 
think, later. It is important to notice, as I am sure one 
can hardly help doing, that the principle of sufficient 
reason is also formulated in terms of character or essence. 
The usefulness of this will soon become quite clear. 
8. Concerning the Relation of the Two Principles Generally. 
There was probably no separation of the principles prior to 
Leibniz. For him, the principle of non-contradiction was 
the principle of possibility, the principle of sufficient 
reason that of reality, and in a sense that of necessity. 
Thus 'possible worlds' are ruled only by consistency, but 
the real world requires a sufficient ground, God and his 
goodness. It may be also said that the principle of non-
contradiction is the principle of analysis, or of analytical 
judgments, while the principle of sufficient reason is the 
principle of synthesis, or of synthetical judgments. Now I 
must admit that it is my intention to obscure all that. Not 
to destroy it, for there may be yet important things to be 
said in that connection, but certainly to blunt the seeming 
dichotomy. It is my intention to maintain that the relation 
between the principles is in fact that of identity, or to 
put it another way, to maintain that Leibniz' division may 
be useful in some ways, but it is not a distinction of 
independent principles. My formulation of the two principles 
is intended to facilitate this conflation, if you please. 
Recall that each was formulated in terms of the character of 
an object: That the character of a thing may not possess 
contrary predicates and that everything must find its ground 
in the character of an existent object. How then is one to 
see these two as being identical, or at least equivalent? 
(Equivalence is weaker of course, but will suffice for the 
purpose at hand.) Unity is the key. The principle of non-
contradiction as I have stated it really says that an 
object must have a univocal or a unitary character. The 
denial of the principle of sufficient reason is an assertion 
that the object with which it is to be associated is in-
determinate in some respect, which is to say that it does not 
have a univocal or unified character. Thus the assertion or 
denial of each is really an assertion of the unity of thing-
hood or a denial of the same. I thus maintain that the two 
principles are identical; but since I have allowed that the 
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apparent difference in their scope may be useful, I will 
satisfy myself with the equivalence of the principles. 
9. Again Concerning the Minimum Standards of Understanding. 
Thus it is possible to state the minimum standard of 
understanding in a rather simple way: The object to be 
understood must have a unitary or unified and well-defined 
character. Again I wish to emphasize the quite general 
notion of object employed here, and indeed the somewhat 
open notion of the character of such an object. More needs 
to be said on both of these points, but that will develop 
at a later point. Now it may be pressed here that this has 
not said much, as no one would suppose an object to have 
anything but a single character. I grant this entirely. 
As minimal standards, one would hardly expect them to make 
excessively strong requirements. The importance of what I 
have done thus far, as I see it, is to show that one may 
not deny one principle and affirm the other. Now no one 
has been seriously tempted to deny the principle of non-
contradiction, but many philosophers and physicists take it 
as their duty to deny or call into question the principle 
of sufficient reason. As the two principles were seen 
to be independent, these thinkers naturally saw no difficulty 
in adhering strictly to the principle of non-contradiction 
and discarding the principle of sufficient reason. If I 
am correct, this cannot be done. The two principles (really 
one in my opinion) must be affirmed or denied together. It 
is naturally my belief that they must both be affirmed, and 
of course the opposite view is fraught with difficulties, 
since plainly one cannot understand what such a denial 
comes to. I suppose, however, that there may be those real 
mystery-lovers who will join Cratylus in wagging their 
fingers, but I think it fair to say that such persons have 
removed themselves from the philosophical enterprise and 
make no demands on those who seek, according to their 
nature, to know. Perversity may be understood as a trait of 
certain humans, but that to which the perverse cling is 
usually nonsense, and requires nothing of the philosopher. 
There is, however, another sort of claim which, owing to 
its source, may be of considerable depth, and that is that 
there may be existents which are not objects or things. 
The candidates for such non-object status are rational 
beings, or perhaps rationality in itself. Now I frankly 
do not know exactly what is to be understood by this, but 
I will try to examine the claim with respect to the proposed 
candidates for the non-objects after developing some more 
appropriate concepts. The importance of seeing whether 
sense can be made of this claim is self-evident from my 
formulation of the minimum standards of understanding, for 
then either my formulation is inadequate or rational beings 
are essentially mysterious. But more on this point later. 
This concludes the discussion of when an object is under-
standable: Namely, when its character is univocal. 
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10. Transition to the Notion of Substance. What, then, 
has the foregoing to do with substance? I suppose in 
order to see the connections clearly, one must see, roughly, 
what one understands by the notion of substance, or better, 
when one is inclined to employ the notion of substance. 
It is my belief that the notion of substance finds employ-
ment when one wishes to distinguish one sort of thing from 
another sort (or other sorts) of things in a fundamental 
way; to cleave, as it were, one thing or sort of thing from 
all the rest in a very deep way. Thus, according to 
Aristotle, individuals are substances in the primary sense 
more or less in virtue of their individuality itself: 
They are in a fundamental sense separated from other indi-
viduals. Thus, one might say of the Atomists, Atoms and 
the Void are substances because of the fundamental cleavage 
between Being and Not-Being, and one might say of Parmenides 
that there exists only one substance because Not-Being 
was thought by him to be impossible. Descartes showed that 
body and mind must be separate substances by showing the 
independence of the two: That one might think whether there 
be a material world or no. I use these merely as problemati-
cal examples, as such interpretations would require, no 
doubt, considerable discussion, but I believe that a 
similar prima facie case can be made in the history of 
physics, for example, matter and energy were considered as 
substances as long as it was thought that there was a 
fundamental independence of the two. Perhaps one could 
put it in the following way: As long as the character of 
a thing is seen as complete in itself, that thing is thought 
of as a substance. 
11. On the Notion of Substance. So I think it possible to 
say that one mark of substantiality, at least,is independence, 
which conies from a certain completeness of character. What 
is it for a character to be complete in this way? Clearly, 
it must mean at very least that the most significant, or 
essential, properties depend on the internal character of 
the thing and not on any thing or substance outside itself. 
This means, I believe, that a substance cannot have been 
produced by or from any other thing or substance, since 
surely being produced is a dependence. Clearly also these 
properties (essential ones) cannot be affected by anything 
exterior to the substance, nor may any substance affect any 
other substance in this respect. Now the big step is this: 
If a character is fully independent, that is if such a 
character is fully complete, then it may in no way be 
affected by other substances. This is what Leibniz meant 
when he claimed that "monads have no windows," for example, 
and this sets the tone for the notorious problems of 
dualisms (pluralisms may be a better word). The very 
perfection of character which merits the name substance 
implies complete lack of connections or (real) relations 
between (or among) those things taken to be substances. 
This again is what Leibniz meant when he asserted that all 
relations are internal relations. Thus the notion of 
substance is that of a completely self-subsistent, fully 
complete character, and thus that of an unproduced, and 
therefore eternal, unaffected thing. Naturally this is 
not to claim that everyone who wrote or thought of 
substance had precisely this in mind. Only a few thinkers 
have clearly seen the real consequences of the notion of 
substance to any degree—Leibniz and Spinoza being the two 
who most readily come to mind. My claim is, I suppose, 
that it was this notion of substance which thinkers are 
inevitably drawn to, sometimes very confusedly, sometimes 
with hostility. But I believe that this is the proper 
framework to employ in a discussion of substance. One 
more point: Kant characterizes substance typically as 
that which is subject only and never a predicate. I feel 
that this formulation is altogether consistent with the 
foregoing, and that this can easily enough be seen when one 
considers predication in the sense of being a determination. 
A completely and perfectly independent thing.cannot be 
the determination of any other thing. Nor can it be 
determined by any exterior thing. But this is merely to 
show that my formulation is plausible even on the Kantian 
interpretation. 
12. On the Number and Existence of Substances. Here 
begins a most difficult inquiry: What can be said about 
substances with regard to their existence and their number 
from just what is known concerning the requirement for 
intelligibility? To deal with this issue, I will employ, 
obviously, in a more or less direct way the principles of 
non-contradiction and sufficient reason. The exact relation 
of the notion of substance to these principles will of 
course have to be explored, but first I will merely use 
them to make certain points more clearly. First concerning 
the number of substances: There seem to be only three 
distinct possibilities. Either there is one and only one 
substance, or there is some finite number of substances 
greater than one, or there is an infinite plurality of 
substances. One may see these points of view reflected 
respectively in Spinoza, Descartes, and Leibniz (to stay 
within a period). There are two ways to proceed here: 
Positively, that is, to show that one of the views is 
necessarily the case, and negatively, that is, to show 
that two of the views are unacceptable and so the third 
must be true (disjunctive syllogism). The latter, of 
course, hangs upon having exhausted the possibilities 
through such a trichotomy, and so should properly have a 
demonstration of this exhaustiveness. I nonetheless choose 
to employ the negative method and to do so without prior 
demonstration of the exhaustiveness of the trichotomy; but 
I would like to restate the trichotomy in order to reveal 
more clearly what is involved. It is: Either there is 
necessarily one and only one substance, or there is some 
arbitrary finite number of substances, or there is necessarily 
an infinite number of substances. This statement does not 
differ from the first except that the first was cast in 
such a way as to distinguish merely numerically and not 
modally and as a result could lead to confusion, and if 
taken as I stated it would lead to a confusion. It is 
conceivable that there be one substance, but the unity be 
accidental, and so would be an arbitrary finite number, and 
not a true unit. I believe any mere materialism would be 
of this sort. This is distinguished according to modality 
from a necessary unit. So the last statement of the 
trichotomy is the one which I will deal with, and I take it 
to be self-evident that there is no fourth option to this 
trichotomy. It will be possible also to use certain 
positive signs to fortify the result. So first: Can there 
be a finite plurality, or non-necessary unity, of substances? 
Now the reason that there be some number and not more or 
less wants an explanation, which must be found in the 
character of an existent object. But if a substance, being 
truly independent, cannot depend upon another thing, 
then there cannot be a finite plurality of substances. 
What of an infinite plurality of substances? One might 
think that the foregoing argument suffices generally against 
pluralisms, and indeed it may, but it is not as clear here 
when dealing with infinite quantities, and so I wish to 
avoid at present such a discussion and instead shift the 
manner of proceeding slightly. The question here is: If 
there be an infinite plurality of substances, how do they 
differ from each other? In general, how can substances 
differ? They cannot differ in the perfection of character, 
for any limitation of character requires explanation in 
terms of another object and so would make the substance 
dependent; they may be said to differ in quality; clearly 
they may not differ in modality or relation. Therefore if 
substances differ, it can be only in quality. But if 
substances differ only in quality, then how can an infinite 
number of substances differing only in quality be dis-
ginguished from a single substance with infinite qualities? 
The only distinction possible here is one of modalities: 
Qualities of a substance are not themselves absolutely 
independent, even though they may be absolutely separated 
from each other, or absolutely necessary. Now I believe 
the real key is the integrated principle of non-contradiction 
and sufficient reason, which is that an object must have 
a unified character, for this provides a further difference 
between a single substance with infinite qualities and 
infinite number of substances differing qualitatively. 
It is this: The Totality of an infinite number of sub-
stances differing in quality lacks the unity of character 
demanded by the principle. There cannot be, therefore, 
an infinite number of substances differing in quality. 
This leaves, of course, that one and only one substance 
(necessarily one and only one) of either finite or infinite 
qualities exists. It does not require much to see that 
just as there cannot be a finite number of substances, so 
too the one substance cannot have a finite number of 
qualities. So the answer to the first question is that 
there can be only one substance and it must be infinitely 
qualitatively rich. I wish to drop the word "quality" and 
adopt the technical word "attribute" here, as the term 
"quality" may have overtones which I do not intend to 
attach to the notion. Thus substance is one and has infinite 
attributes. Now the foregoing is really quite important, 
as it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an attribute of 
substance and a substance itself and this had led to many 
difficulties. This must be further explicated at a later 
point. But for now, on to the question of the existence of 
substance. Although this is a question of some import, 
I plan to give a quick answer. To come to be requires a 
cause sufficient to produce the thing; now a substance 
cannot be produced from another thing, as then it would not 
be independent, not to mention the previous claim that 
there can be no other substances from which it could con-
ceivably be produced. Ceasing to be likewise requires 
outside limitation which is impossible for precisely the 
same reasons. That which can neither come to be nor pass 
out of existence must be eternal and necessary. This I 
assert that there is a necessary, unitary substance of 
infinite attributes. 
13. What is the Relation of Substance to the Integrated 
Principle of Non-Contradiction and Sufficient Reason? It 
is my opinion that the three must be very closely bound as 
should be obvious from the discussion to this point. I 
have already indicated that the principles of sufficient 
reason and of non-contradiction should be regarded minimally 
as equivalent; and more satisfactorily as identical. I now 
wish to make precisely the same claim with regard to the 
integrated principles and the notion of substance. They 
are minimally equivalent: The truth of the integrated 
principle implies this notion of substantiality and the 
existence of substance guarantees or implies the integrated 
principle. But I believe they are just three moments of the 
same principle, which is constitutive of being as such. A 
rough statement of such a principle might be something of 
this sort: Being must have a thoroughly unified character. 
The three previous principles exhibit this principle in 
three aspects: The principle of non-contradiction might be 
seen as the form of unity in being, the principle of 
sufficient reason represents what I'll call the material 
unity in being, and substance the forra-in-matter of being. 
Now I'm not certain how far I would press this, as the 
notion of matter here is obviously a great deal different 
from any ordinary such notion. But some such analysis is 
most certainly inviting. Now as the principles are identical, 
I do not object to using any particular formulation where 
it appears most useful; I merely maintain that any one of 
them might just as profitably be used with no change in the 
results. There is no real priority among them, although 
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the notion of substance might be nicer because it exhibits 
more directly the relation among the three, but that is 
not deeply significant. In the end, this merely asserts, 
with Parmenides, that Being is one. 
14. What Else May Be Known of Substance? Both quite a 
lot and not much. I could repeat many conclusions of some 
import from Spinoza's Ethics, with some profit, no doubt. 
But it is not my intention here to give a thorough explica-
tion of the notion of substance. And in the end, it is 
only very general conditions which one can easily apprehend. 
The notion of a mode is necessary in this connection at 
least, and by it I mean nothing more than a certain deter-
mination of substance, but one must be careful to note that 
such a determination must arise from the nature of substance 
itself, and from nothing else. Since all modifications 
arise from the nature of being alone, all are without 
qualification necessary, though they are contingent in the 
sense of being dependent. I concur with Spinoza that 
thought and extension are two of the infinite number of 
attributes, although the notion of extension may have to 
be altered somewhat. I do not concur with Spinoza's treat-
ment of time and feel that some more adequate discussion 
of its nature must be forthcoming, and I have had some 
thoughts on this, but I must-confess that I am as of yet 
not satisfied with the role of time in this, or any other, 
philosophical system. Let me return for a moment to the 
earlier discussion of the attributes. Although each 
attribute must be understood through itself, it is not 
thereby independent. What is meant is that no attribute 
can be understood through any other attribute and so is 
independent in just that sense from the other attributes; 
it is not independent in the way that a substance must be 
independent. In fact, the independent existence of an 
attribute is quite inconsistent with the previously enunci-
ated tri-fold-principle of Being. But it is sufficient 
to see only that the attributes may both be seen as substances. 
Thus I have nothing more to add here concerning the nature 
of substance. 
15. At Last the Question: What Are the Conditions for 
Full or Complete Understanding? All of the foregoing flows 
from the minimal conditions for understanding. The question 
remains how much more one can find out. The question is 
not susceptible to a really precise answer at this point. 
Certain things can easily enough be said: Only an infinite 
intellect can comprehend all being fully. Another way to 
say this is that only nature can know itself fully. The 
limitations on the human intellect in concrete terms are 
naturally restrictive when compared to the infinite intellect. 
But that comparison is hardly a useful one. What one 
wishes to do, I take it, is to understand the real connections 
of being. This proceeds I believe in a fashion analogous 
to the process of an infinite intellect. One tries to unite 
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seeming differences into a whole. I will call these 
wholes quasi-substances, for the intellect proceeds by 
isolating quasi-substances as the explanations for other 
things which were once themselves seen as quasi-substances. 
Intellect can fully realize that this process does not 
yield absolute results without thereby discounting the 
importance of such a process. Further, one can know 
absolutely that a quasi-substance can be found to ground 
any other quasi-substance. Now we proceed via quasi-
substances just because it is necessary for full under-
standing, or any partial understanding, that the character 
of the quasi-substance be apprehended. It is not sufficient 
to know, however certainly, that such a quasi-substance 
exists if no apprehension of the quasi-substance is 
available. But alternately, it is no less certain that 
such a quasi-substance exists, even if no apprehension is 
forthcoming. This is essentially the difference between 
adequate knowledge of a thing and a full or complete 
knowledge of it. Neither is to be scorned, though certainly 
it is the task of science and philosophy to provide the 
fullest and most complete knowledge of being open to human 
beings. Thus to state briefly a few of the limitations on 
human understanding is appropriate. Foremost, it is finite, 
but the magnitude of its abilities is not easy to estimate. 
Secondly, it apparently has access to only two of the infinite 
aspects of being. The reason for this needs some considera-
tion from philosophy, but it suffices here merely to note 
the fact. Naturally, there are historical limitations as 
well. Science is at a certain stage and must progress from 
this point. The truly important point to be noted, however, 
is that I intend to agree wholeheartedly with the claim that 
even partial knowledge is knowledge and ought not be 
despised. Science must understand what it can in virtue of 
whatever quasi-substances it can apprehend, and proceed as 
best it can. 
16. I believe not much needs to be said as a conclusion. I 
hold that one can know absolutely that Being or substance 
or God or Nature is thoroughly rational and without essential 
mystery: That it is One. I claim also that Man is very 
far from understanding fully Being itself, but that this does 
not stand in opposition to knowing in some degree, through 
some way, a part of Being. And I hold it to be the sole task 
of inquiry, whether it be called philosophy or science or 
just curiosity, to come to be the best understanding possible 
of whatever is. There remains but one topic which I promised 
to consider; and I must do so now. That is whether there 
are existents which are not things. I must say that what 
I have said thus far surely denies any straight-forward 
interpretation of this. But let me try to state why such 
a claim might be made on behalf of rational agents, who are 
in fact the only intended members of this class. It is 
desired to cleave off men from nature, to set them apart. 
Why? In an attempt to save that illusory notion of freedom, 
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absolute and unbounded, of the will, which is contradicted 
by experience and by reason. Only by making the rational 
agent essentially and thoroughly mysterious are they able 
to make an equally mysterious doctrine appear appropriate. 
Frankly, I find the move most unhappy, for it apparently 
removes from the realm of rational inquiry the rational 
agent himself. I find that not only contradicted by what 
I believe are the principles of Being itself, but also a 
fruitless attempt, for the notion of freedom so purchased 
is completely unable to aid human understanding in any way 
whatsoever. As I have previously indicated that I am not 
entirely certain what is intended by the forementioned 
claim, I hope and trust that if I have misconstrued it in 
some way that its propounder will instruct me further in 
its meaning. This ends what I wish to say at this time 
about substance. 
Johannes Gutenberg-Oniversit'at 
Mainz 
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Connecting Nature and Freedom in 
Kant's Third Critique 
Thomas Donaldson 
One of the express purposes of Kant's Critique of Judgment 
is to provide the all important ground of mediation Between the 
two earlier Critiques. Indeed the ultimate success of Kant's 
critical philosophy itself may be said to hang with his ability 
to demonstrate that such a ground of mediation exists to unite 
the seemingly different realms of nature and of freedom. To view 
Kant as offering two worlds for our consideration, one (as in 
the first Cri tique) which stands only under the mechanical laws 
of nature and the categories, and the other (as in the second 
Critique) which stands only under the laws of freedom, is to 
recognize in Kant an uncomfortable dualism which, without making 
any allowances, we should find untenable. 
Because our idea of philosophy as a system (and indeed of 
reality itself as unified) does not allow an absolute plurality 
with no ground of mediation from one to another, we are prone to 
reject as untenable any philosophy which suggests an absolute 
plurality. And yet we do discover in Kant a kind of absolute 
plurality in his separation of understanding from reason; a 
separation which, in turn, divides the theoretical from the 
practical , the realm of nature from the realm of freedom, and 
finally the territory of the first Critique from the territory 
of the second Cri tique. 
Now 1 believe it is precisely because this separation is 
regarded as unavoidable and even necessary by Kant that the need 
for a ground of mediation becomes so pressing, and I hope to 
clarify in this paper the role of the third Crit ique in effecting 
this mediation. True to his method, Kant aims here at a synthesis 
of nature and freedom by introducing a "third thing" which will 
provide a common basis of unity; and in this case the "third 
thing" is simply an indeterminate condition for apprehending 
nature and freedom themselves. 
It is right to begin this investigation by recognizing the 
bare pluralities which are explicit in Kant's philosophy. By the 
time of the writing of the third Critique it is clear that the 
legislation of reason results in at least two kinds of conditions: 
in its theoretical employment it results in the conditions of nature, 
and in its practical employment it results in the conditions of 
freedom. Now this double division of the legislation of reason 
(to which a third division will be added in the Cri tique of 
Judgment) cannot be reduced to an obvious unity according to Kant, 
